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THE \'lORLD ~lARKST FOR COCOA
Instability, speculation and international misunderstanding 44/73 .........
In the last few weeks of 1972, all international agreement ",as at last "larked out
for cocoa. The effort and negotiation which went into its preparation had con-
tinued,on and off, for more than fifteen years.
Cocoa has a respectable history. It first c~e to Europe four centuries ago,in
the days of the Emperor Charles V. It is a native of the American continent,
but nowadays the main production is in Africa. In the world of today it is
entirely a product of the devel~ping countries. For some years Ghana, Nigeria,
the Ivory Coast,Cameroon and Togo,have been exporting between them more than
a million tons of cocoa u year, and in Latin-America the big producer:is Brazil,
while New Guinea is making its first diffident advance into the market.
:E'or rilOst;:of-~:the producing countries, cocoa is one of the pillars of the national
economy. It accounts for more thqn half the exports from ~hana; and in Nigeria
the cocoa bean is second only to oil·as an export product and accounts forl6 %
.of the total.
These countries of the developing lvorld thus have the monopoly of the product
for which the industrial world has so strong a taste; but they have never
succeeded in securing control of the price. There is no point in asking the cost
of a pound of cocoa,unless you specify the date; for within ten years the price
bas ranged between 12.2 cents (US) per pound and a peak of 48.7 cents. Lhase
prices, of course, relate to exactly the same product, of the same so-called
"merchant" quality.
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Careful cultivation
This does not make things easy for the cocoa planter,despite the work of
official organisations for stabilising prices in Africa -- marketing boards
and stabilisation funds -- none of which CBn tell in advance how much the
trees will yield that year. This of course is partly the fault of nature;
for cocoa is a ,very sensitive plant. The soil has to be neither too dry nor
too moist,but just right; and sometimes it calls for careful irrigation. It
is very sensitive to the weather; and too much sunshine may be as disastrous
as too little. The trees are not difficult to grow; but the planter must
be at hand to deal with parasites and plant-sicknesses,and the products he
uses for this unfortwlstely do not follow the same market trends as cocoa
itself. ~hen it comes to picking,too, great care is needed; for the fruit
must be cut one by one at the moment of ripeness,11ith the same stI'ict care
as a bundh ofdessert grapes. fIhe pod,or "cabosse",is sh:lped like a small
rugby football; and the next job is to open it and extract the bean. After
this the beans are piled up for fermentation and there is quite a difference
. between well fermented beans and others; and then they ure spread out for
drying and lose a lot of their moisture -- but not all of it of course.
To calculate the cost price of such an operation is beyond the scope of the
common computer; and remembering that all this time the price is still an
unknown factor, it is impossible to say what will be the profit. This is why
the cocoa palm,especially in Kfrica,is for the most part a family crop,and
the hours of la.bour do not have to be calculated.
In english-speaking Africa the cocoa then comes into the hands of ccntrally-
organised Boards,and in the countries of former French Africa, it is taken
over by private companies. The cropping period runs from September to
December and is folloded by a secondary cropping in the spring.
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In the consuming countries the cocoa is then processed on ~n industrial
basis. Only a small proportion of the beans is processed locally in the
producing countries; and the main part goes to the grinding mills in the
consmning countries,wllere the beans yield up the cocoa butter and the
powder. Lhe biggest consumption isofcourse in the United States,which takes- 3 -
25 %of world productton. Next comes Federal Germany,which takes 12 %of
the world market supply; but this is only part of the consumption of the
Nine-nation European Community,which buys 43 %of the total. It will be
understood from what follows how considerable a part this high consumption
has enabled the Community to play in the negotiations for the international
agreement.
The importers do not all buy the cocoa entirely for their own consumption.
The Netherlands, for example, consume less than 3 kg of chocolate per
head per arillumj but they buy nearly as great a tonnage of cocoa beans as
Federal Germany,which means that the Dutch mills process three times as
much cocoa" as the Dut~~ consume themselves. The rest of the product of these
chocolate industries is sold for export. ~he Netherlands rank as one of
the big world importers; but the consumption per head is much the same as
it is in Federal Germany. The Belgians are bigger consumers,taking 6.8 kg
per head (which compares with 6.2 kg for the British"buttheir imports
are only about a sixth of their Dutch neighbours. France and Italy come
right at the bottom of the consumption scale,taking respectively,only
1.4 kg and 0.6 kg per head.
The european consumer I 'Iofhether he be a big chocolate eater or-a small one,
is always familiar with the names of the great trade marks,under which the
products are sold in his _ O"ID country. Some of these trade marks, indeed,
belong to big multi-:u'1tional com:paniesj and this is a reminder that the
-industrial processing of cocoa into chocolate confection§ry is not a mere
family craft,as is the growing of it in equ&torial Africa. The techniques
which come into play are often of an advanced kind.
A good deal of capital has been invested in the processingindustrYj and
security of jobs is an important factor with the work-people. The industry
,-
is no better able to cope Nith "lide f1uctus.tions in the prices of its ra\'1
material,than are ~the Africans and Latin-Americans "ho produce it. 'rhe only
difference is that the industriali%1sthe "usera
ll of the cocoa are econom-
ically stronger and better able to defend themselves. To them,too,
"speculation
ll is a helpful factor.
When it comes to currencies or the price of land,speculation has a bad
press. t'rom another standpoint,howev8r~serious and impartial economists4 -
realise that it plays a valuable role in keeping prices steady•
.f or commodities,such as cocoa, this operates through the forward market,and
it is not easy t9 make allowance for the part played by brokers and traders
in these markets:'~nd the specuh.tors who are not professional operators. In
the picking season there is plenty of cocoa available in the market; and
this is when the grinders,the professional users of cocoa,buy as much of it
as their financial resources permit,and their storage space accommodate.
Only if they are exceptionally lucky,can they do the whole of their year's
buying in one operation. It is at this point that the forI-lard market operators
come into the picture. 'l'hey take a very careful view of the market prospect,
assembling all the available information,and Ilrepare their estimates of the
probable yield from the current crop,the prospects for the secondary crop
in the spring,the vo~ume of stock carried over and still available and the
supplies the users will want.
In the picking season the fact that there is plenty of cocoa in the market
might be expected to send the price down; but if the market operator, after
all his investiga.tions, comes to the conclusion that it lrill '.'become scarce
later, 4e will decide to buy. He thus helps to put the price up when it might
be falling; and his sales when supplies are running short, will prevent the
price from soaring to levels at which the processing industry would grow
discouraged and start looking for subs~ute products.
Conversely, if the operator expects the crop to be bigger than the market
will require, he sells fo~qard (i.e. for future delivery); but he Hill only
buy the supplies to cover his contract when the crop begins to come forward.
In this way he sells forward when prices are high and comes in as a buyer
at a time ..Then abundant supplies \iOuld othervTise be pushihg prices down. If
the operation is successful -- which is not always the case -- it enables
the user to take advantage of the future fall in price before it happens.
Moreover the ~arket operator,by his cover purchases in the season of abundi~nce,
will be contributing to check the fall in prices which, when supplies are
excessive,does so much damage to the growers.
The system,of course, is valuable only insofar as the forecasts by the
market opera.tors are good. If they are wrong,or influenced by rumour (which- B-
may well have market interests behind it), they may worsen the inotability
of prices; and it is ahays in periods of instability and uncertainty that
speculation is most rampant.
In practice the supply of cocoa is v~ry apt to vary,and the demand is
comparatively rigid. It ~hus has to be acknowledged that the international
cocoa market ranks among those where prices are most volatile and where,
therefore,speculators are most active. This is a basic fact on which the
critic.must put his Orlll interpretation.
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A glance at the recent history of the world market for cocoa,gives an
indication of how irregular the prices are apt to be.
In 1965,production had risen to a record level of over 1.5 million tons;
and this brought the price down to only 17 cents per pow1d. In the few
subsequent years demand went ahead of supply and prices kept steady around
40 cents.
Both in 1969-70 and in 1970-7l,however, the market was again beset by over-
Bupply and there were further price collapses. The average in 1970 a year
when speculators were squeezed through the collapse of a finance company --
was 33 cents per pound; and in 1971 the price again fell by a full third.
The gaps betHeen production and consumption,which occasioned these price
movements,l\'ere of the order of 60,000 or. 80,000 tons out of a total of
about 1.4 million tons. It often takes only a slight imbalccnce to upset the
marb:-t. An example occurred around the end of 1972, ~lhen,according to the
trade precs,the Soviet Union succeeded in bringing off an advantageous
deal,as a result of a fall in the market which followed their announcement
that they were reducing the scale of their buying.
In 1971,when cocoa prices were at. their most depressed,a number of oi1-
producing countries ~ere successfully forcing on their customers a sub-
stantial rise in the price of their product. This was a success for the
"aristocracy of the under-developed. iiorldtr ; and the advocates of price
stabilisation for tropical products took heart at the result. When
President Pompidou.and his Finance f~ini~ter M. Giscard d':Estaing. went to
Africa,they announced their intention of making a fresh start with \-Iork
on organising the world market for cocoa.- 6 -
Honths had still to pass,however,before the agreement ims reached in
October 1972,and eventually signed on January 15,1973. Federal Germany,so
important as a consumer, was inclined 'for some time to hold back; but in
the end the country joined "lith the group of consuming countries,,':hich ..lere
impatiently v.vlaiting its agreement. The risk was,that \-lithout Germany's
12 %of the world market, the agreement might not muster the support of
70 %of world consumption required for its operation.
Since the United States (25 %of consumption) had already decided to keep
out, the full participation of the whole European Community was indispensable.
Federal Germany,in agreeing to join forces ,dth its EEC partners, and. thus
to make the agreement effective, was making a political gesture,moved by
considerations of the importance attaching to its attitude. The agreement
was signed not only by the individual countries,but also by the European
Community.
The agreement is based on annual export quotas l'lhich are to be fixed each
year with a view to the prevailing price levels. The minimum price is fixed
at 23 cents per pOUl1d and the maximum at 32 cents. It is \forth noting that,
at the moment when these limits were being fixed,the market was fluctu~ting
around 32-33 cents. Moreover, the c,lrrent forecasts for 1972-73 suggested
that production would fall short of probabl~ consumption,by about 88,000 tons.
Remembering the price collapse which,only a few years Barlier,had resulted
from a surplus of 60,000 tons,the current condition pointed to another price
boom. From this standpoint it looked as though the agreement would not be
doing t~e consumers too badly; but,of course, it is an illusion to think a
maximum price can be defended without there being cocoa in stock.
As a contribution to price stabilisation,iil a more orderly manngJr~ than
through the simple reaction of market forces and speculation, the Geneva
Agreement provides for setting up a buffer stock. This is not to exceed
250,000 tons,and it is to be financed by 8. contribution of 1 cent per pound.
Here again,however, it looked as though the:l:'e might be difficulties ahead;
for how could it be possible to build up a buffer stock in a market in which
production is apparently less than eilough to cover demand ?•
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Nevertheless, this is not an occasion for pessimism. The International
Cocoa Agreement,despite its complexities and its imperfections, was regarded
by the under-developed countries as a test of the goodwill towards them of
the richer countries. It was for this reason that the European CorJJnunity
threw in all its weight to make the agreement valid,despite the abstention
of the United States. 'fhe countries ;'lhich signed it on January 15, represent
approximately 70 %of the consumer markets,which should perQit of its
coming into force for the cocoa season 1973-74 beginning October 1,1973.
The European Community had already given financial help,through the resources ,
of the European Development i'und.to the national cocoa price stabilisation
Fund in one of the associated African co~~tries-- Cameroon. In the Inter-
national Cocoa Agreement it is fulfilling its ambition to contribute to
setting up steady international mf~rkets for ba~;ic products.so that the
developing countries can be sure of adequate revenue from their exports.
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